In plasmonic systems, the response of nanoobjects under light illumination can produce complex optical maps. Such plasmonic or resonant systems have interesting characteristics such as sensitivity on parameters and initial conditions. In this paper, we show how these complex maps can be cryptographically improved and associated in order to design a secure pseudo random number generator.
Introduction
Pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) are fundamental blocks in various domains of applications such as Monte Carlo simulation algorithms, communications and many cryptographic systems which depend on the quality of the pseudo random sequences. The generated numbers are mainly used as simple pseudo random sequences, private or secret keys or secret signatures. The development of PRNGs has impassioned the researchers for few decades and since then, many techniques to produce such PRNGs have been studied [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . The robustness of such pseudo random generators is crucial to ensure secure applications in cryptograhy and to avoid all the various and existing attacks. A large family of PRNGs is based on sequences generated by single chaotic system or combination of chaotic maps [4, 8, 10, 11] , through a one-way function. Such a combination of several maps by a one-way function improves the security of the PRNG. In this paper, we propose a PRNG based on the use of complex maps produced by the electromagnetic response of plasmonic systems. The study of plasmonic or resonant systems has shown the possibility to produce complex electromagnetic field patterns, with strong gradients and high confinement, superimposed with interference patterns. These local physic effects have opened the experimental and theoretical ways of designing efficient systems in various new applications (sensors, imaging and burning biomedicine applications, security) [12] [13] [14] [15] . For cryptographic applications, the main question concerns the ability of such plasmonic systems, due to their high sensitivities to parameters in the neighbouring of the resonances, to serve as the basis of pseudo random number generator with high efficiency.
Therefore, we propose a method to generate long sequences of numbers, with high quality of randomness, based on the complex nature of plasmon simulations. The nanosystems permit to produce complex optical maps and provide inherent tamper-evidence due to their sensitivities to the initial parameters and initial conditions. We show how these complex maps, through a numerical process, can produce sequences that have high level of randomness, in compliance with the classical tests of randomness on binary sequences [16] . This can be used as a base of secret key between two parties in a symmetric cipher (e.g. One-time pad). The high level of security of this inspired-plasmonic system is related to the number of freedom degrees used to generate the pseudo random sequence and the physical complexity of the plasmonic structures. These degrees of freedom can be grouped into two categories of parameters, of completely different origin. The first one ( P  ) can be related to the physical parameters required to model the nanostructures (materials, shapes). From the constructed 3D spatial maps of the electromagnetic field, a second set of parameters ( N  ) can be assigned to a numerical processes consisting in an adaptive remeshing process and a modular transformation. These processes ensure quality
The Proposed Cryptosystem
The core of the PRNG algorithm is based on the contruction of two plasmonic maps obtained by computing the electromagnetic field interacting with metallic nanoparticles.
Nanoworld as Source of Complex Maps
The process of production of pseudo random sequences we propose, is based on a model of plasmonic resonance [14, 18] . The interest here is the interaction of the coupling of light-matter at a nanometric scale which is kwown to induce strong gradient of the field and complex interference patterns. The resonance of the interaction between light and matter is very sensitive to all physical parameters: size of the nanoobjects, materials and illumination characteristics. The numerical simulated signals on which we work is the total electromagnetic field in the vicinity of such metallic nanostructures. It comes from the numerical resolution of the vectorial Helmholtz' equation governing the electric field vector and the Maxwell's equations relating both electric and magnetic field vectors E and H satisfying: 
Construction of the Generator a h
The "physical" 3D maps
H I x y b used pseudo random sequences eys in an encryption scheme, because the distribution of the spatial intensities is not random enough relatively to the requirements of a random sequence. Therefore a renumbering of the spatial nodes is necessary to be able to create more disorder in these intensity maps, which will give us a stronger derived sequence z cannot or secret k e directly as   out n  . A two-steps numerical process is achieved on the d and intensity maps in order to satisfy both criterion of maximum entropy and randomness statistical characteristics.
The first step consists in an homogenization of occurrence of fields and intensities thro fiel ugh the redistribution of intensity level by a 3D adaptive meshing process [19] with an a posteriori error estimator based on the maximum entropy. This adaptive scheme of remeshing of the domain  
, , x y z uses selected frequencies of each intensity levels occurrence as target. For this goal, second order polynomials are used to interpolate intensity levels, to generate additional points in the tomography map (or equally to suppress the nodes corresponding to too numerous intensity levels). Each point of the domain 
Such a produced numerical pseudo random is therefore deduced from the plasm sequence onic   out n  pr cal signa ocess. The complexity of the plasmonic simulated optil of nano-objects and the various parameters used are the assets of this cryptosystem and the global set of parameters
In principle arameters used s the physical p eem to take an infinity of values (i.e. or even non existin  ,   , g materials can be used in the model). With all this parameters package, the exact reproducibility of the sequence   out n  is almost impossible if the exact parameters used are unknown. Indeed, in the vicinity of the plasmon re nce, an error on one of the used parameters can produce enough variations in the produced image map (in term of the exact value of the pixels in the formed image). Due to the high internal complexity and without a robust reverse engineering method, this construction process is now a good candidate for a PRNG permitting to produce a long pseudo random sequence.
A fundamental advantage of any kind of PRNG is the quality of pseudo random sequences. According to th sona e K ion produced pseudo ranMoreover, the analysis eration of a Subspace of Pseudo Random Sequences befo These sequences are obtained from the erckhoffs' principle [20] , the security of a cryptosystem only depends on its keys. In any cryptosystem, a poor key or a limited key space  induces a weakness of the cryptosystem (i.e. which can be easily broken by testing all possibilities: brute-force tacks). Indeed, the limit of brute-force attacks on the parameter space depends on the entropy of this space. For a given today's computer speed-up, it is commonly admise that a key space (space of parameters) of size 128 38 2 10    (i.e. smaller than 128 bits) is not sufficiently secure [21] . In the present case, the generated key rmits to overpass the lower limit of 128 bits of entropy. Each key is corresponding to two kinds of input data related to numerical or physical characteristics.
Results and Discuss
In this section, the results on the dom sequences are presented. methods based on the randomness and correlation properties are discussed and applied to the generated sequences.
Gen
A subspace of pseudo random sequences is produced re analysing. simulation of a plasmonic device and the numerical remeshing process in the construction of the pseudo random sequence
. This analysis puts forward the quality of the outputs produced following a change of consecutive parame consider the electromagnetic images of the interaction of light with gold nano-particles of radius ters. We that there are many missing levels of intensities. We also remark the non regularity in the occurency of the zero-bit value (0) relatively to one-bit value (1) in the corresponding binary sequence of this image (62.51% against 37.49% for the image of Figure 1(a) ). The output sequence t low stru ure from w S e fact th   out n  , obtained after a xor operation between   E X n and   H X n , presents the characteristics of randomnes (see Figure 1(e) ) and pass all the NIST tests successfully (see Section 3.2.1).
Statistical Analysis
In order to analyse the qualities of the produced pseudo oaches are developped and random sequences, two appr used. These qualities are investigated following both aspects: randomness properties of the individual sequences and correlation between multiple sequences. NIST statistical test battery have been chosen for the following reasons. Firstly, it contains many famous tests from the Diehard battery with some extra tests. Secondly, it was used in the AES evaluation process to check the randomness of the output sequences of each candidate algorithm. Moreover, the NIST tests have also shown their ability to ckeck pseudo random number generators in smart cards [22] . This NIST suite consists in a statistical package of fifteen tests developped to quantify and to evaluate the randomness of (arbitrarily long) binary sequences produced by either pecially the binary correlation between the produced sequences. 
Correlation Analysis
In this second approach the purpose is to check the correlation between the produced pseudo random sequences. Compared to the previous approach (Approach 1.2), the correlation between sequences are analysed globally by computing the correlation coefficients of each pair of sequences [23] . Let the two sequences   is presented in Figure 2 .
The result exhibits a very weak correlation between the sequences and ) can be now viewed as a pseudo random octal sequence. The outputs of PRNG must have both strong quality of randomness and strong independence between these outputs. The results of the analysis, o ned two approaches, show the randomness level of the pseudo random sequences and the quasi independence that may exist between a group of produced pseudo random sequences. 
lysis
T lu ation Therefore, the analysis must take into account all the critical points of the cryptosystem and must meet cryptographic ents [24] . In the , the investigated points are: the size of the key space, the key sensitivity, points are investigated thro Heuristic Guess-and-Determine Attack [25] , Distinguishing Attack [26] .
Key Space
A good generator of (pseudo) random sequences should have a large key space in order to make brute-force attacks infeasible. It is generally accepted that a key space of size smaller than 128 2 is not secure enough [21] . The theoretical size of the key space given in the (Section 2) is 5 4 1 ). This clearly overpass the lower limit of 128 bits. Therefore, the size of the key space is large enough to resist brute-force attacks. Such a large space of keys is a necessary condition, but not sufficient. Indeed, all the keys must be equiprobable and the corresponding outputs must also be cryptographically strong.
Key Sensitivity
The s s ity on the key is an essential factor for the pseudo random generation based on optical system. Indeed, only a small deviation in the input should cause a large change in the output. Here, the key is given by various kinds of inputs (physical parameters) such as the radius of the nano particle en itiv ). The key sensitivity analysis must be normally achieved on all these parameters (physical and nume al parameters). Neverthless, the ain sensitive parameters concern physical ones. Therefore, we can limit this analysis to mainly four physical parameters: the radius of the nano-particles Actually, in the study of correlation (Section 3), the sensitivity was already indirectly tested due to the selected near values of input parameters. Here, the analysis is achieved on individual physical parameters in order to analyse the sensitivity of these parameters through e computing of the correlation coefficient values. To analyse the sensitivity to the physical parameters, w r the generation of large pseudo random sequences 3) Sensitivity of the re he material permi- ely. The correlation coefficients between these three produced sequences are presented in Table 4 . The cryptosystem is also sensitive to the value of real part of the rmitivitty. itivity to the imaginary part of the material permittivity:
The f eter is the value of the imaginary part of the complex permittivity of the gold nano-particle In this paper, the NIST tests are used to evaluate the equences.
out tween these three produced sequences are presented in Table 6 . These coefficients are closed to 0 then the tested outputs are c  ffici to be ve alue. A m atical analysis would be necessary to determine is the PRNG is robust or not before being used. Indeed, whichever way the cryptosystem is designed, the produced output must be strong (i.e. random, decorrelated and sensitive). Several and various statistical tests are available for evaluating the randomness of binary sequences. Reference test suites for PRNGs are the NIST suite [16], TestU01 [27] and the DieHARD suites [28] . randomness level of subset of pseudo random s As previously mentionned, the NIST statistical test battery are chosen because it contains many famous tests from the Diehard battery with some extra tests and used to check the randomness of the output sequences of each candidate algorithm in the AES evaluation process and smart cards [22] . The correlation between such pseudo random sequences was also evaluated (see Statistical analysis in Section 3.2). The sensitivity to the parameters of the key (  , p r , p  , m  ) was also analysed. All the produced pseudo random sequences pass successfully the tests.
of Pseudo Random Sequence

Security against Attacks
We also analyse the security of the cryptosystem against two types of attacks: Heuristic Guess-and-Determine Attack and Distinguishing Attacks. general attack on stream ciphers [25] . The main idea of this attack is to guess in the first time the value of few unknown variables of the cipher. Next, the remaining un equences are eq l, then the guessed values ar and the cryptosystem is broken, else the attack d with new guessed values. We consider that the system is kn the it ems that the attack discussed in reference [25] can not n-lin known variables are deduced by iterating the system a few times and by comparing the produced pseudo random sequence with the original pseudo random sequence. If these two s ua e correct should be repeate own by attacker, se be applied correctly on the proposed cryptosystem which is not of the same family of involved stream ciphers. In fact, the model and the structure of the proposed PRNG is completely different. An alternative way to apply this attack would be to guess and to fix the values of physical parameters and to iterate the algorithm by searching the remeshing ones to produce the sequence out  . Once all the comparisons made without success, the first set of input values is guessed again and the process is repeated until success. This process has almost the same complexity than a classic brute-force attack.
2) Distinguishing Attacks: Any output of a stream cipher (or PRNG) designed for cryptographic applications, should not be statistically distinguished from a truly random sequence. In fact, distinguishing attacks described in reference [26] , try to find traces of the distinguishing property by exploiting the weaknesses of the algorithm related to the linear and no ear combinations. Here, the generated sequences pass successfully the standard statistical tests for randomness. Moreover, the only linear masking occurs when we applied   E X n and   H X n it kills any information on linear dependance then, the attack becomes ineffective.
Conclusion
In this paper, a n NG using two p nces w ented.
ew PR lasmonic maps to generate long pseudo random seque as pres Such a generator has shown its ability to produce a very large number of pseudo random sequences which can be usefull in several cry tographic applications. The randomness quality on the plasmonic maps is improved through the use of remeshing pr nd one unction (xor operator). The advantages of the generator are the size of the key space, t p ocess a -way f he sensitivity to the initial inputs (keys), the quality of pseudo random sequences vel against several attacks. More na and the security le over, these produced sequences do not present correlations which ensuring a large variety of pseudo random sequences and a higher security level. Of course, this method can be enriched by increasing the complexity of the nanostructures (including substrates, multi-materials, ...) inducing complex interaction patterns and strong gradients and by considering experimental field measurements.
